Witness to a Crime in Cuyahoga County, Ohio

Summer and Fall 2004 saw the historic canvassing and registration of 100,000 new voters in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Many of those who submitted voter-registration forms did not have their information entered correctly or at all. Many submitted cards without supplying their date of birth, and over a thousand would-be voters had invalid registrations because of this. (Early versions of the voter-registration cards had an “*” next to date of birth, but did not mention that it was required information. Registration forms also did not include the address of the Cuyahoga election board.)

The layoffs of 10 people at the Cuyahoga Board of Elections resulted in a shortage of personnel in the months leading up to the election. More than 312,000 non-duplicative voter-registration submissions had to be “entered” into the voter-registration system. Upper management requested additional manpower, but director Michael Vu failed to acquire the needed staff.

Yet, in September, just two months before the election, the board implemented a brand-new Diebold voter-registration system (DIMS), an “unforgiving”system which, for example, permitted the entry of invalid addresses, yet flagged those registrations later as “fatal errors”, resulting in the voter’s ineligibility to vote. When asked why he made the controversial decision to install a new registration system right before this historic election, Director Vu explained it as “getting ready for electronic voting.”

The rushed entry of 312,000 registration submissions and 100,000 new voters into a the new DIMS system by a stretched workforce lead to many data-entry mistakes (undoubtedly contributing to the 15,000+ “invalid/incomplete” registrations) and a significant number of “not entered” registrations. In addition, in the conversion from the old and new voter-registration system, at least 600 voters were mysteriously dropped from the roles. And key information (e.g., “cancellation date”) was not “carried over” into the DIMS system. Numerous attempts to address the large number of invalid registrations were ignored by Director Vu. Dr. Norman Robbins provided timely evidence of these incomplete/inaccurate entry and the feeble attempts to notify people of their “fatal” registrations. For example, an ad was placed in the Plain Dealer on October 28^th in Section G, page 21-- the “car ads” section—listing those with critical problems, but phone lines were jammed in those final days before Nov 2nd.

Hundreds of people who requested absentee ballots never received them, and the manager of the Absentee Department abruptly resigned before election day. Many received their ballots just days before or on election day—they were the lucky ones. Because of the large number of people who did not receive their absentee ballots, a decision was made to allow voters to vote at their precinct on election day, but this information was not made public in a responsible way. The Official Voter Information Guide sent to registered voters specifically told them that they could NOT vote at the precinct on election day.

Thousands of voters without recent election history were purged from the registration roles, and hundreds would find out too late that their registration had been cancelled. These people were told that they would be eligible to vote in the next election, but not in “this election.” But, because of the selective manner in which the purges were made, tens of thousands who met the “no-voting-history” criteria remained on the roles as eligible voters. Because we have not yet received the cancellation date information, we do not know if voters were cancelled after the latest legal cancellation date—90 days prior to Nov 2^nd.

Poll workers were inadequately trained to deal with the new provisional ballot procedures. This fact was made known during the election when procedures were followed haphazardly and with wide variability among election workers.

The suspicious last-minute recruitment, training and deployment of “special inspectors” raised serious concerns by those who learned of and then participated in the special election-eve “special-instructor” training. The notice of this last-minute training was given to the Bush-Cheney campaign before it was communicated to the Kerry-Edwards campaign.

11/2/04 “The election”:

Special Inspectors and other Mysterious Visitors

Some of those “special inspectors” deliberately interfered with voters finding their correct precinct. In the Parma Heights polling place, where I was a designated challenger (the only designated challenger at that location), there were three extra “special inspectors” (there should only be one per polling place), and all demanded that I NOT talk to voters. Each one openly criticized me in front of voters, scolding me for doing their job. I was NOT to help people find their precinct! I did help at least three people find their precinct—three people who otherwise would not have known their precinct. I left in tears at 4pm after the “4^th inspector” told me he was going to call the police unless I “go and sit back down.” My crime: I had I read a voter’s registration card and pointed her to her correct precinct. Other polling places had hostile “special inspectors” and experiences like mine. Others had their own “mystery guests.” I asked for a report identifying the “special inspectors”, and the report showed that my polling place had one person assigned. Who were the other “mystery inspectors?”

There seemed to be no established procedure for getting additional voting machines, and my lead “special inspector” reacted with hostility when I asked him about the status of getting more machines. It took over two hours to repair the broken machine that began the day inoperable and even longer to get additional machines. It was obvious that the distribution of voting machines was very unfair. Precinct A had over twice as many registered voters as other precincts within its polling place, yet it had fewer working machines than those precincts. It was very obvious to those who waited in line 45 minutes as people in other precincts had virtually no wait. Many voters, frustrated by having to wait in the long line, asked me why we couldn’t use the voting machines that were not being used in the other precincts. Some had to leave before getting to cast their vote. (Other polling locations had even longer lines, denying even more people of their right to vote.)

There were not enough poll workers, and many were inadequately trained. Poll books had duplicate voter-registrations for the same person. More alarming, however, was the fact that the poll books frequently failed to show registrations of long-time voters, shocking and angering these would-be voters.

There were many complaints about the stuffiness and the smell of fumes in my “service garage” polling place. Several people with asthma and other respiratory problems left because they could not stand handle the environmental situation. Chairs were virtually unavailable—the older and more frail voters were forced to stand for the entire 45 minutes. Yet there seemed to be no remedy for these problems. When I relayed these concerns to one of my “special inspectors”, I was told to have the people come directly to him with their complaints (thus having to get out of line). I was told not to walk around in the vicinity of voters—that way, they would not be able to tell me of their concerns. My “special inspectors” rarely responded to any of these concerns. The phone lines to the board of elections seemed to be busy, making resolution of these and other issues delayed or impossible.

A cab driver who has worked during past elections picking up election judges and retrieving ballot transfer cases was alarmed by changes in their procedures, and told me that, given the chaos at the Board of Elections before she went to her polling place, she wouldn’t be surprised if there were many other election-related problems.

Getting Election Information from Cuyahoga BOE

We were able to obtain voter-registration data from the IS department without problem, but found it harder to obtain certain types of information: 1) reports from the central-tabulator system, 2) provisional ballot data and 3) certain voter-registration transaction dates (especially “cancellation dates”: dates when voters were purged from the registration system.)

A copy of the log report from the computer system that counts and tabulates the votes was finally received (over a month after it was requested), and the date of the report is Nov 8^th, not Nov 2^nd/3^rd. Before the report was received, we were told that there were no computers used, the computer system had no reports, the computer system had no modem (which they’ve since admitted having), etc. I am still waiting for a copy of the log report from the recount from December 16^th.

We asked for the detailed provisional data—with individual and precinct information—in electronic form (an extract file), and were given the individual data in the form of a PDF report, and was told that THAT was the only format in which they would provide the data. After they told us they didn’t know if precinct information was tracked, we asked to see the original provisional envelopes. When I was given access to this information, I was given a report with the precinct information that I needed. I also learned that there is a precinct-level Provisional Summary report. By the time we received the requested information, the election results had already been certified.

We still have not received cancellation dates that were requested six weeks ago. There were many voters whose votes were denied because they had been selectively purged from the registration system, but we do not know when they were purged. We were told that cancellation date was not carried over from the old system to the new system. They do not track the number of provisional ballots rejected due to cancelled voter registrations.

Before the recount, I asked to see how the ballot-rotation data was associated with precincts and asked to see where this information was maintained in the central-tabulator system. I asked if they would print a report showing the precinct-to-rotation data. To all of these requests, I was told “No.” They agreed to describe the reading/counting process to us, but would not “power up” the central-tabulator system for us to examine its operation.

Evaluating Provisional Ballots

There were more than 24,000 provisional ballots cast by voters in Cuyahoga County who braved miserable weather to reach their polling place, and then waited in long lines. These people expected that their vote would be counted. (This number does not include those who came to the polls to vote, were told that they were not registered, and left the polls without casting a provisional ballot. It also does not include those who did not have the luxury to wait in the long lines or to travel to a second polling place after being told they were at the wrong polling place.)

The process of evaluating which ballots would be counted took between one and two weeks. At first, the process was relatively transparent, but after several days, a new policy was adopted: observers were required to sit six feet behind the clerks evaluating the provisional envelopes, a distance which made it impossible to read any of the information.

The decision may have been made after observers discovered that provisional envelopes were being rejected for not having date of birth written on the outside of the envelopes. After the public learned about the date-of-birth rejections and began calling the boards of elections, Blackwell reversed this stringent rejection policy.

Over 8,550 provisional ballots were rejected, more than 35% of those cast--the highest percentage in Ohio. Earlier elections had seen rejection rates of 17%. Over 2,100 were rejected for voting in the wrong precinct. Another 5,500 were “not registered.” Of these 5,500, it is not known how many of these were rejected for “lost”, “cancelled” or “invalid” registrations (due to missing or mis-entered information). We have asked for access to information to help us determine this breakdown, but have been denied access to this information.

The public has been denied access to provisional ballots, voter-registration cards, absentee request cards, as well as the poll books. Blackwell’s “lockdown” prevented the public’s access to all election documents until after the certification. And Cuyahoga BOE has provided its own excuses for denying and delaying information.

The process of evaluating provisional ballots for validity was anything but transparent.

11/29/04 The Cuyahoga Board of Elections meeting to certify the Official Election results (We can get a copy of the transcript of this meeting for approximately $500 unless the BOE itself decides to ask for a copy, in which case, we may get a discount.)

During this public meeting attorneys and analysts, including Dr. Norman Robbins and myself, cited incidents of voter suppression and disenfranchisement, describing hundreds who had been “lost” in the voter-registration system. Dr. Robbins pleaded with the board to let volunteers examine the 8,566 rejected provisional ballots and the original voter-registration cards to recover those “lost” voters. I expressed my concerns over the thousands who had been purged from the roles, while tens of thousands had not been purged. I also complained about the lack of transparency in the observation of the Provisional Ballot Evaluation process. We were told not to worry. “We quadruple checked them. We’ve gone beyond the call of duty” said Bob Bennett, chairman of the board of elections, and, notably, chairman of the Ohio Republican Party. “All in favor?” Aye’s all around. The certification of the election was unanimously approved. Our concerns were dismissed.

12/16/04 - The “bogus” Cuyahoga Recount

In the days leading up to the recount, people were concerned about the fact that only three percent of the votes would be examined (unless there were discrepancies between manual and machine counts). And analysts insisted that the chosen precincts be randomly selected or selected by some statistical sampling method that would guarantee adequate representation of the statewide election results. Attorneys negotiated with Michael Vu about the selection method and were told that the public could request a subset of the precincts to be counted. Meanwhile, three days prior to the recount, Jacqui Maiden told a group of analysts that the precincts would be selected by the election officials. We said that this was not “random” and she then asked us “this is how we always do it.”) It seemed that the selection of “recount precincts” was already made, or would be made within the next day. We asked if we could know in advance which precincts had been selected. She said “No, it wouldn’t be fair.”

On December 16, 2004, the first day of the Cuyahoga recount, Director Michael Vu addressed scores of recount volunteers who had donated their time and energy to witness a “3% non-random pre-selected-precincts” recount of Cuyahoga’s ballots; a recount designed to measure the accuracy of the card-reading and tabulating software for 34 pre-selected precincts (This was not a recount designed to measure the wishes of the people!) Vu said that he wanted to “close the books on the 2004 election.” The volunteers stared at him in amazement, shaking their heads. A few booed. These volunteers, many from out of state, had a different goal: to ensure that every eligible vote that was cast would be counted.

Those who fought hard for a recount wanted a manual recount of all the ballots. Blackwell and Ohio’s election officials had another plan: a “bogus” recount—a staged event that would give the Ohio election legitimacy and would put to rest this historic election in time for the holidays. I couldn’t help thinking what a waste of people’s lives and energy to be doing this “bogus recount” for Blackwell and the Cuyahoga Board of Elections, helping provide the “legitimacy” they wanted and helping the election officials “close the books” on this fraudulent election. It didn’t seem to matter that they are further undermining an already shaken voter confidence.

As expected, the staged event went smoothly. The totals from the card readers and the tabulators agreed with the hand-count totals. We, in the computer room, were concerned about the way the precincts had their ballot-rotations assigned. We asked to have a Rotation Report printed before the “97% count” was to begin. “No, we can’t take the time to do that. We are going to proceed with the counting of the 97%” was the response. The elections staff began machine counting the “97%” before finishing the “3%.” We were told that they would print a Rotation Report only after the recount. We have yet to receive that report. We have not yet received the requested copy of the official computer log or the official recount canvass report.

Some interesting observations were made, however, by witnesses of the hand-counting process. Three precincts’ ballots were sorted so that all Kerry’s votes were together, all Bush’s votes were together, and so forth, providing indisputable evidence that the ballots had been hand-counted at least once before.

12/22/04 - The Cuyahoga Board of Elections meeting to certify the Recount results

The meeting started over an hour late (bad weather). After the recount results were read aloud, a motion was made to certify the recount results. It was seconded. Some individuals said, “wait, don’t we get a chance to speak. George Taylor asked to speak. “Well, make it quick. You have 2 minutes.” was the response by one of the board members. I thought to myself “2 Minutes for Democracy.” George asked about the procedure for selecting the precincts for the recount, stating that picking only the “large” (550+ votes) precincts underrepresented large segments of the population. “What are your procedures for preparing for the recount?” he asked. “We can’t tell you that now. You should submit a public-records request,” was the response. George asked if the ballots had been “handled” before the official witnessed recount. After some hesitation, they said “Yes.” George said they should not have done that without public witnesses. There was some confusion among the group (I was delighted that Kathleen was filming this!). There were some lame explanations that amounted to “that’s our procedure, that’s the way we’ve always done it. Now, can we get on with the certification already?”

George provided evidence of a new group of disenfranchised voters: 365 who voted in the correct precinct, but were rejected for voting in the wrong precinct. Another 836 “wrong precinct voters” were in the correct polling place, yet denied their vote. (These 1201 voters comprise just the latest batch of disenfranchised voters to be identified through analysis of public data recently (12/13) received from the board, data that was requested weeks ago (11/16.)

Michael Vu dismissed George’s concerns, saying some of the information was just “recycled” from previous meetings and that the new information (the 1201 “wrong precinct” rejects) was not relevant to the recount.

I thought, “Thousands of provisional voters who had their ballots wrongly rejected in a non-transparent evaluation process, were not relevant?” Why is it that, by the time we have access to the information to show massive disenfranchisement, it is “too late” to be relevant? Is this Democracy? (Earlier in the day, when presented with the information of the denied “wrong precinct” voters, another election director from a major metropolitan area responded in surprise, “That is a crime!” He said that his county had taken a number of special measures to counteract the effect of Blackwell’s clearly partisan this-election-only help-America-not-vote ruling: “voters must vote in their correct precinct.” In addition to sending out cards to registered voters, notifying them of their correct voting place (as had Cuyahoga), the large central-Ohio county hired special “provisional judges”, one for each precinct, and set up a special phone bank for those judges to call for “correct precinct” information.)

“Does anyone else want to speak?” 2 microseconds passed. “Okay, all in favor?” Aye’s all around--passed unanimously. To Cuyahoga Board of Elections, this election is over. They have “put this election behind them.”

To many, this election is nowhere near over. We will be the investigators. We will be the media! We will be the activists! This is just the beginning!